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The most common indicator of the financial performance of development finance institutions,
the Subsidy Dependence Index of Yaron (1992a), fails to recognize that subsidies are like equity
injections whose use over time has a cost. Thus, the SDI underestimates subsidy. This paper gives
a modified framework that counts all subsidies as equity injections. The paper also recasts the
traditional SDI formula to clarify its definition and to show its invariance with respect to the form of
subsidized resources. The modified framework is applied to the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and
to Caja los Andes, a microfinance organization in Bolivia. The underestimation of the traditional
measure is material. The modified framework could be applied to any subsidized organization.1
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1.1 Why measure subsidy?
The goal of development finance institutions is to improve the welfare of the poor people who
buy its financial services. This is so whether the DFI is a microfinance NGO or whether it is a public
development bank. A big cog in this goal is self-sustainability (Krahnen and Schmidt, 1994). In turn,
self-sustainability hinges on financial self-sufficiency (Khandker et al., 1995). A subsidized DFI is
financially self-sufficient if it could provide the same services without subsidy.
Measuring subsidy matters because measuring financial self-sufficient matters. Financial self-
sufficiency means the DFI would not shrink if it had to pay market prices for all its resources.
Financial self-sufficiency matters because access to subsidized resources waxes and wanes with the
whims of donors. If a DFI is not financially self-sufficient when donors withdraw, then it will shrink.
Eventually, it will die and abandon its clients.
An indicator of financial self-sufficiency is more practical than a full-blown benefit-cost
analysis. Measuring financial self-sufficiency requires measuring social costs, which is cheap, but
benefit-cost analysis requires measuring benefits, which is costly (Von Pischke and Adams, 1980;
David and Meyer, 1980). For transactions between DFIs and donors, financial self-sufficiency implies
that social benefits exceed social costs because the DFI could compensate society for its costs. For
transactions between DFIs and clients, the benefits must exceed the costs or else the clients would
buy financial services elsewhere. If no one loses, then everyone wins.
A DFI is subsidized if society, through donors, entrusts it with subsidized resources.
Subsidized resources have below-market prices and come involuntarily from taxpayers. The expenses
of an unsubsidized DFI are more than the expenses of an otherwise-identical subsidized DFI. The
difference is the subsidy, a cost not counted as an expense.
Donors want to measure subsidy because they want to know how far the fledgling DFI could
fly in the market. Donors want to know this for least three reasons. Each reason boils down to the
scarcity of donor resources compared to the abundance of better welfare wanted by poor people.
The first reason donors want to measure subsidy is because a financially self-sufficient DFI
could attract capital from selfish private investors. Private capital would free donors to ply their trade
elsewhere. In addition, there is more private capital than donor capital, so private capital could











The second reason donors want to measure subsidy is because the DFIs are many but the
donor dollars are few. Donors want to allocate resources earmarked for development finance to the
DFIs with the biggest bang for the buck.
The third reason donors want to measure subsidy is because development finance is only one
of many ways society could improve the welfare of the poor. Donors want to allocate resources to
the use—development finance, sports stadiums, or primary education for girls—with the biggest bang
for the buck.
Like donors, the managers of a DFI also want to measure subsidy. Managers care about
subsidy not because they care so much for the welfare of the poor but rather because they care about
their own jobs. Employees at DFIs usually enjoy unusually high pay and the perk of warm feelings
from helping the poor. There are few jobs so good in low-income countries. If donors withdraw and
the DFI shrinks and dies, then managers will lose their good jobs. Thus, managers want to measure
subsidy to know how far they are from being able to survive donor withdrawal.
Financial self-sufficiency is seen from the point of view of the DFI. The opportunity cost of
subsidized resources from the point of view of the DFI is less than the opportunity cost of resources
from the point of view of donors or of society. Still, because the opportunity cost of the DFI probably
is more than the opportunity cost of society, financial self-sufficiency from the point of view of the
DFI implies worthwhileness from the point of view of society. Financial self-sufficiency is sufficient,
but not necessary, for the social benefits of a DFI to be more than social costs.
1.2 How is subsidy measured now?
The most common indicator of the financial performance of development finance institutions
is the Subsidy Dependence Index (Yaron 1997; 1994; 1992a; 1992b). The SDI eschews the
accounting point of view of a subsidized DFI. Instead, the SDI takes the economic point of view of
a hypothetical unsubsidized DFI. The financial statements of subsidized DFIs usually ignore subsidies
or handle them in arbitrarily. In addition, expenses for the use of subsidized resources reflect below-
market prices. Thus, the expenses in the financial statements are smaller than the opportunity cost of
the subsidized resources to the DFI. The genius of the traditional SDI is to inject economic logic into
the accounting information using the assumed opportunity cost of subsidized resources to the DFI.
The gist of the traditional SDI (SDI ) framework is the calculation of subsidy (S ). The SDI
T T T
is the “percentage increase in the [DFI’s] average on-lending interest rate required to compensate for
the elimination of subsidies” (Yaron, 1992a, p. 16). This is a linear function of S . The SDI is a ratio
T
of compensated subsidy to revenue from lending:
(1)
The compensated subsidy CS  is the subsidy net of the transfer of resources that would be
T
needed to keep the same services without subsidized resources and with zero profit.3
The SDI  is simple, and its logic is common sense. It is widely accepted, and it has become
T
the center of any serious analysis of the performance of DFIs (e.g., Hashemi (1997); González-Vega,
et al., 1997a; Chaves and Quiròs, 1996; Khandker et al., 1995; Schreiner and González-Vega, 1995;
Gurgand, et al., 1994). In fact, the belief that microfinance can reach the masses self-sustainably is
based mostly on SDI s (Christen et al. 1995, Benjamin, 1994).
T
Despite the simplicity and popularity of the SDI , some changes have been proposed. The
T
changes of Khandker et al. (1995) are shown by Morduch (1997) to be mistaken. Cosmetic changes
to the traditional SDI have been proposed by SEEP (1995), the Inter-American Development Bank
(1994), and Holtmann and Mommartz (1996).
Christen (1997) and Benjamin (1994) improve the SDI  materially. Christen (1997) adjusts
T
the income statement so that expenses include the opportunity cost to the DFI of subsidized
resources. He also removes grants from revenue. This creates financial statements amenable to the
traditional techniques of financial analysis for commercial banks. This opens the door to peer
comparisons, an important management tool and motivator (Richardson, et al., 1993; Koch, 1992).
Christen does not, however, recognize that subsidized equity can be more than the total accounting
equity. Benjamin (1994) considers the different risk premia of debt and equity, an important and
necessary complication first suggested by Yaron (1992b).
1.3 How should subsidy be measured?
From an economic point of view, all subsidies are like to equity injections. This paper modifies
the SDI  to account for this fact. A DFI that is financially self-sufficiency could pay the same return
T
to society for an injection of equity as the DFI would have to pay to a private investor. This return
is the opportunity cost of the DFI, and it is also the opportunity cost of the private investor. It is the
return the private investor could have expected from an investment of like risk.
S  is a lower bound on the DFI’s expenses if it replaced subsidized resources from donors
T
with equivalent unsubsidized resources from the market. In reality, the DFI does not pay a market
price for the use of its subsidized resources. Therefore, it is as if the DFI got another transfer of
subsidized resources equal to the subsidy that was not paid. This follows from the logic of the SDI
T
framework itself.
The SDI  framework ignores this implicit equity injection. The modification proposed here
T
just takes the logic of the traditional framework to its full end. Private entities would not entrust
resources to a DFI unless the DFI paid the opportunity cost of the resources in the long run. The
modified framework gives a lower bound on subsidy that is higher than the lower bound in the
traditional framework.
The modification matters both in a single period and over a series of periods. In a single
period, there is a transfer of subsidized resources implicit in the subsidies received and kept by the
DFI. There is an opportunity cost to the DFI for the use of the resources provided by the non-4
payment of the full price of subsidized resources. There is a subsidy on the subsidized resources made
from a subsidy. If the DFI did not pay a private entity for the use of resources entrusted to it, then
the private entity would count the unpaid return as a further investment. A private investor would
expect above-average returns later to make up for below-average returns now.
Over a series of periods, the measure of subsidy should include not only the subsidy on
subsidized resources from the subsidy received in the current period, but also the subsidy on
subsidized resources from subsidies received in previous periods. This follows from the logic of the
private investor and the logic of the SDI  itself.
T
1.4 Does the difference between measures of subsidy matter?
The difference between the subsidy measured by the traditional and modified frameworks is
not the useless sandbox play of alternative-assumptions-thus-alternative-conclusions scorned by
McCloskey (1996). In practice, the difference is big. How big? For the Grameen Bank, the difference
in 1994 is about $7 million, and the accumulated difference from 1986 to 1994 is about $42 million
in 1994 dollars (Table 6). For Caja los Andes, the difference in 1995 is about $550,000, and the
accumulated difference over the four years of Andes’ life is about $1.1 million in 1995 dollars (Table
12).
This is a lot of money. But it is small change for the organizers of the Global Microcredit
Summit in Washington D.C. in Feb. 1997. They made the lofty goal of giving access to financial
services to 100 million of the world’s poorest people by 2005 with a budget of $21.6 billion (The
Economist, 1997). In the United States, the bill H.R. 1129 of March 19, 1997 would earmark $170
million in 1998 and $180 million in 1999 for development finance in low-income countries (New
York Times, 1997). Development finance is even touted as a way to help U.S. welfare recipients get
themselves a job (Wall Street Journal, 1997).
These are wonderful goals. The problem is that the assumption that the benefits are more than
the costs is based on a handful of projects. The few DFIs that have been judged as successful have
achieved that status because SDI s showed them as either almost financially self-sufficient or just
T
barely financially self-sufficient (Khandker, et. al., 1995; Christen et al. 1995, Benjamin, 1994). But
if the SDI  underestimates subsidy and therefore overestimates financial self-sufficiency, then
T
development finance may not be such a good use of scarce development resources after all.
This paper modifies the SDI  framework. The modified framework capitalizes subsidies just
T
as a private investor would capitalized unrealized returns. Subsidy in the modified framework is a
higher lower bound than is subsidy in the traditional framework. This ratchets the performance
benchmark of DFIs up a notch.
Subsidy should be measured not only at a point in time but also over time. It would not make
sense to judge the benefits and costs of a dam that took five years to build by looking only at the
benefits and costs in the sixth year. It also does not make sense to judge the benefits and costs of5
development finance by looking only at one period. It is true that past costs are sunk for some
analyses so that the relevant measure of subsidy should ignore past subsidies. But usually even these
analyses is enriched by looking at subsidies in the long term. “The Parable of the Subsidized Servant”
in Appendix 1 shows how the differences between the traditional and the modified frameworks can
matter both in a single period and over a series of periods.
The paper is also didactic. There have been many errors and misinterpretations of the SDI
T
formula. This paper reformulates the SDI  in terms of well-defined basic accounts so that the formula
T
itself shows the economic concepts behind it. The reformulation also shows that the SDI  is invariant
T
to the way the DFI receives resources.
The paper has four more sections. Section 2 is a typology of the ways a DFI can receive
subsidized resources. Section 3 recasts Yaron’s (1992a) SDI  in terms of the accounts of a set of
T
stylized financial statements. Section 4 modifies the framework so that it counts the subsidies made
by the subsidized resources that are unpaid subsidies. Section 5 gives the traditional and modified
measures for the Grameen Bank and for Caja los Andes. It also uses the modified measure in a
pseudo-benefit-cost analysis.
2. Typologies of subsidized resources
A DFI can receive subsidized resources explicitly or implicitly. A DFI gets subsidized
resources explicitly when it gets things for free. Examples include cash grants or donated assets such
as computer equipment or vehicles. Explicit transfers are often recorded in the accounts.
A DFI receives subsidized resources implicitly when it pays a below-market price or when a
donor pays for something bought by the DFI. For example, a donor may pay for training of
employees of the DFI or for an analysis by a consultant. Or donors may lend funds cheaper than
private sources would lend. Likewise, donors may not demand returns on equity investments as a
private investors would. Such transactions make subsidized resources by letting the DFI use resources
that otherwise it would have paid and lost.
2.1 Subsidized resources are not subsidies
The concept of subsidized resources is not the same as the concept of subsidies. Subsidized
resources are entrusted to the DFI at a below-market prices. Subsidy is the difference between the
market price of a subsidized resource and what the DFI pays.
Suppose society entrusts a DFI with the use of $100 for a year with a loan without interest.
Suppose m is the market rate of interest for such a loan to a borrower as risky as the DFI. The
subsidized resources gained by the DFI as a result of the loan is the difference between the
opportunity cost and what is paid $100@(m–c). The subsidy from the use of the subsidized resources
for a year is not $100@(m–c) but rather m@$100@(m–c). The $100 of loan principal itself is neither a
subsidy nor a subsidized resource.6
The concept of subsidized resources is linked to the concept of subsidies. Subsidies from the
use of subsidized resources do not go away; they become subsidized resources and make more
subsidies. The SDI  ignores this link.
T
Suppose a DFI got $100@m as a subsidy from a loans of $100. If the DFI were unsubsidized,
it would pay this $100@m, and it would need to increase its average debt in the period by $100@m/2
to keep the same level of service as in the subsidized case. It would pay $100@m /2 for this extra debt.
2
The $100@m /2 is also subsidized resources since it is a resource the DFI would not have if it were
2
not subsidized.
2.2 A DFI can receive subsidized resources in six ways
Two of the six ways a DFI can receive subsidized resources are explicit, and four are implicit.
The first way a DFI can receive subsidized resources is explicitly as a cash grant accounted for as an
equity injection. The subsidy is not the grant itself but rather the return the DFI would pay in the
long-run for capital from a private investor. The opportunity cost is the opportunity cost of equity,
as it is for all types of subsidized resources.
The second way a DFI can receive subsidized resources is explicitly as a cash grant accounted
for as revenue. All grants should be accounted for not as revenue but rather as equity injections. This
is because grants are not from the DFI’s business operations. Still, DFIs inflate accounting profits by
counting grants as revenue. The economic effects of grants accounted for as revenue are the same
as the economic effects of grants accounted for as equity injections. Both increase equity. As always,
the subsidy is not the grant itself but rather the increase in the usage cost the DFI would incur if the
extra equity from the grant had come from private investors.
The third way a DFI can receive subsidized resources is implicitly as discounts on subsidized
debt. The discount is the difference between the market price for debt of similar risk from private
lenders and the price the DFI paid to donors. The discount is not the subsidy. The subsidy is the
opportunity cost of the use of the subsidized resources provided by the discount. The discount
reduces expenses, increases profits, increases retained earnings, and so increases equity. Thus the
opportunity cost on subsidized resources provided as discounts on subsidized debt is the opportunity
cost of equity.
The fourth way a DFI can receive subsidized resources is implicitly as discounts on operating
expenses due to a donor’s paying for something bought by the DFI. Such purchases are discounts on
operating expenses only if the DFI does not record the full price of the purchase as an expense and,
in the case of assets, if the DFI fails to record the asset on the balance sheet. If either of these
conditions are not met, then the transaction is either unsubsidized or falls into one of the other five
ways of receiving subsidized resources. Discounts on operating expense decrease expenses, increase
profits, increase retained earnings, and increase the amount of equity belonging to society. The
subsidy on the subsidized resources created by discounts on operating expenses is the unpaid
opportunity cost on the extra equity. In practice, discounts on operating expenses are varied,7
common, and elusive. They leave no trace in the financial statements. Examples of discounts on
operating expenses include exemption from reserve requirements or coverage of training costs or
organization expenditures.
The fifth way a DFI can receive subsidized resources is implicitly as discounts on capitalized
subsidies. Capitalized subsidies are subsidies for which the DFI has not yet reimbursed society. As
discussed above, these subsidies make subsidized resources with an opportunity cost.
The sixth way a DFI can receive subsidized resources is implicitly as reinvestments of positive
profits. Positive profits belong to owners. If they are not withdrawn, they are implicitly reinvested.
Retained earnings have an opportunity cost just like any other form of equity.
The opportunity cost of all six types of subsidized resources is the opportunity cost of
subsidized equity. The opportunity cost of subsidized equity is the return a private investor would
expect in the long run for an investment of similar risk to the DFI.
Subsidized equity is the resources entrusted by donors to the DFI. Subsidized equity includes
grants accounted for as equity, grants accounted for as revenue, capitalized subsidies, and any portion
of positive retained earnings due to donors. Subsidized equity also includes discounts on debt and
discounts on operating expenses. If the change in retained earnings in any period would have been
negative without subsidies, then subsidized equity will be more than total accounting equity. This is
the usual case in practice.
Subsidized resources are the same regardless of which of the six ways they are received by
the DFI. Likewise, the subsidy linked to subsidized resources does not depend on the form of the
subsidized resources. Cash is fungible, implicit cash even more so.
Measured subsidy should not depend on the form of the subsidized resources. If it did, then
donors and accountants could give a DFI subsidized resources in ways that implied less subsidy than
would other ways that are identical from an economic point of view. If the measured subsidy is not
invariant to the form of the subsidized resources, then a DFI could have different estimates of
subsidies depending on whether it got $100 as a grant recorded as equity, as a grant $100 recorded
as revenue, as a discount on subsidized debt, as $100 of free training, as a discount on capitalized
subsidies, or as unwithdrawn positive profits.
The next section recasts Yaron’s (1992a) SDI  framework in terms of the accounts of a set
T
of stylized financial statements. The reformulation uncovers two important facts buried in the
traditional formula. First, S  is invariant to the way the DFI receives subsidized resources if a
T
definition is clarified. Second, the SDI  correctly excludes subsidized resources and includes only
T
subsidies.
3. A reformulation of the traditional subsidy frameworkSDI
T
t ’
At@(mdt– ct) % SEt@met% Kt – Pt
LPt@it
,
mdt’ Opportunity cost to the DFI of debt,
met’ Opportunity cost to DFI of equity,
At ’ Average periodic subsidized debt,
ct ’ Periodic interest rate paid on subsidized debt,
SEt ’ Average periodic subsidized equity,
Pt ’ Accounting profit,
LPt ’ Average periodic net loan portfolio, and
it ’ Average on&lending interest rate.
8
Probably the most oft-quoted passage in development finance is the definition of the SDI
(Yaron, 1992a, p. 17). The definition here follows the passage except in using different opportunity
costs for debt and for equity:
(2)
where
K is a plug. It cancels with other parts of the formula so as to exclude subsidized resources t
and to include subsidies. But the original definition of K is hazy. Yaron (1992a, p. 17) says K is “the t t
sum of all other types of [periodic] subsidies received by the DFI in the period (such as partial or
complete coverage of the DFI’s operational costs by the state)”. This makes it clear that K should t
include discounts on operating expenses and that K should exclude both discounts on subsidized t
equity and discounts on subsidized debt. But it is unclear whether K should include grants accounted t
for as revenue and/or grants accounted for as equity. Yaron (1992a) implies that K excludes grants t
accounted for as revenue by saying “all other types of [periodic] subsidies” [italics added] because
accounting profit already includes grants accounted for as revenue. To add to the confusion, K is t
called “miscellaneous subsidies” (p. 53). K is defined explicitly below. t
The idea of the SDI  is (1), and the implementation of the idea is (2). The two denominators
T
in (1) and in (2) are obviously the same. But the two numerators are not obviously the same. Many
users of the SDI  (e.g. Khandker et al., 1995) say that A@(m – c) + K + SE@m  is the subsidy
T
t dt  t t  t et
received in the period. But this is wrong. Only the term SE@m  is subsidy. K is a plug and it includes, t et t
as will be shown, not subsidy but rather some forms of subsidized resources. Likewise, A@(m  – c) t dt t
is not subsidy but rather the discount on subsidized debt. Finally, P in (2) is accounting profits, not t
profits without subsidies as in (1).
3.1 Non-accounting data
Both accounting and non-accounting data are used to estimate subsidy. The non-accounting
data are the opportunity cost of subsidized debt, the opportunity cost of subsidized equity, and any
discount on operating expenses. The opportunity costs of subsidized debt and of subsidized equityRevenue operationst ’ Revenue lendingt % Revenue other operationst, and
Total revenuet ’ Revenue operationst % Grants as revenuet.
Total expensest ’ Acct. expense subsidized debtt % Acct. expense other operationst.
ct ’ (Exp. sub. debt.t)/At,
9
are counterfactual quantities that must be assumed by the analyst guided by Yaron (1992b) and
Benjamin (1994). The DFI or donors must divulge any discounts on operating expenses.
Yaron says the SDI  estimates financial self-sustainability by taking “full account of the overall
T
social costs entailed in operating a DFI” (1992b, p. iii). The opportunity cost of equity used by the
SDI  is not, however, the opportunity cost of society. Rather, it is the opportunity cost of the DFI.
T
It is not the return society could get on its resources in their best other use but rather the price the
DFI would pay for equivalent resources from the market.
In general, the opportunity costs of society and of the DFI are not the same. For example, a
weak DFI may not be able to borrow $1,000 from a private lender without paying an annual rate of
interest of 100 percent. The opportunity cost to society of $1,000, however, is probably between 10
to 20 percent per year.
Thus, the SDI  framework does not measure social costs. It does not take the point of view
T
of society. It takes the point of view of the DFI. Which point of view matters depends on the question
the analysis intends to inform. It is easy to adjust the framework to account for social costs by basing
m  and m  on the opportunity costs of society. Section 5 has an example. dt et
3.2 Accounting data from the income statement
The non-accounting data are combined with accounting data from the financial statements.
Tables 1, 2, 7, and 8, are examples of sets of stylized financial statements for the Grameen Bank and
for Caja los Andes. For revenue in the income statement in Tables 1 and 7:
For expenses in the income statement:
The accounts do not record True expense for subsidized debt nor Discount for subsidized t
debt. But given that: t
and taking the periodic average of stocks as the sum of the opening and closing balances divided by
2, then A@(m  – c) is the Discount on subsidized debt: t dt t tAt@(mdt– ct) ’ At@mdt– At@ct,
’ (mdt/2)@(Sub. debtt &1 % Sub. debtt) – At@(Exp. sub. debtt/At),
’ True exp. sub. debtt – Exp. sub. debtt,
’ Disc. sub. debtt.
True exp. debtt ’ Exp sub. debtt % Disc. sub. debtt .
True exp. other op.t ’ Acct. exp. other op.t % Disc. other op.t.
Acct. profitt ’ (Total rev.t – Total exp.t),
’ (Rev. op.t % Grants as rev.t) –
(Acct. exp. debtt % Acct. exp. other op.t),
’ (Rev. op.t % Grants as rev.t) –
[(True. exp. sub. debtt – Disc. sub. debtt) %
(True. exp. other op.t – Disc. other op.t)].
True profitt ’ Rev. op.t – (True. exp. sub. debtt % True. exp. other op.t),
’ Acct. profitt –
(Grants as rev.t % Disc. sub. debtt % Disc. other op.t).
)R.E.t ’ Acct. profitt,
’ True profitt – (Grants as rev.t % Disc. sub. debtt % Disc. other op.t).
Total assetst ’ Net loan portfoliot % Other assetst.
10
(3)
The True expense for subsidized debt is the sum of the expense in the accounts and the t
discount on subsidized debt:
(4)
The identity for operating expenses is similar:
(5)
Accounting profit is total revenue less total expenses. This can be expressed in terms of
operating revenues, true expenses, and transfers of subsidized resources as grants and discounts:
(6)
True profit is revenue from operations less true expenses, or what accounting profit would t
have been without subsidies. True profit removes grants accounted for as revenue and discounts on t
expenses from Accounting profit in (6): t
(7)
Retained earnings links the income statement to the balance sheet:
(8)
The SDI  assumes no private owners and no dividends. This is relaxed later.
T
3.3 Accounting data from the balance sheet
In the assets in the balance sheet in Tables 2 and 8:
For liabilities:Total liabilitiest ’ Subsidized debtt % Other liabilitiest.
Close paid&in cap.t ’ Open paid&in cap.t % )Paid&in cap.t,
Close cap. grantst ’ Open cap. grantst % Grants as equityt,
Close R.E.t ’ Open R.E.t % )R.E.t, and











t &1 % TSE
T









(Grants as equityi % )R.E.i)] %
(met/2)@(Grants as equityt % )R.E.t).
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In each of the three sets of equity accounts, closing equity is the sum of opening equity and
the change in equity. The book value of shares bought by private investors with their own money are
counted in Paid-in capital. The book value of shares bought by donors are counted in Grants as t
equity. The sum of the three closing equity accounts is Total equity: t t
3.4 The formula for the traditional measure of subsidy in terms of accounts
Given m  and m  and Discounts on other operating expenses, the SDI  can be expressed in dt et t
T
terms of the accounts from the stylized financial statements. (3) puts the first term in the numerator
of (2), A@(m  – c), in terms of the accounts. t dt t
Expressing SE @m , the second term in the numerator of equation (2), in terms of accounts t et
T
uses three facts. First, the average subsidized equity used in the period, SE , is the average of the t
T
TSE  and TSE , the subsidized equity outstanding at the opening and at the closing of the period. t-1 t
T T
Second, TSE  is the sum of TSE  and the change in subsidized equity during the period, )TSE . t t-1 t
T T T
Third, )TSE  is Grants as equity plus )R.E.: t t t
T
(9)
The numerator of (2) is the traditional measure of compensated subsidy CS . It combines the t
T
definition of K below with (3),  (7), (8), and (9): tCS
T




(True profitsi % Grants as equityi % Grants as rev.i %
Disc. sub. debti % Disc. other op.i)] %
(met /2)@(True profitst % Grants as equityt % Grants as rev.t %
Disc. sub. debtt % Disc. other op.t) %
Kt –
(True profitt % Grants as rev.t % Disc. sub. debtt % Disc. other op.t).
Kt ’ Grants as rev.t % Disc. other op.t.
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(10)
The first line of (10) is A@(m  – c), the second through fifth lines are SE @m , the sixth line t dt t t et
T
is K, and the last line is P. (10) is just a reformulation of the traditional compensated subsidy in the t t
numerator of (2). Nothing has been modified yet.
If the measured subsidy is to be invariant to how the DFI receives subsidized resources, then
all types of subsidized resources must enter (10) symmetrically. This requires:
(11)
This definition of K is not in any of the plethora of papers and reports using the SDI , t
T
although SEEP (1995), the Inter-American Development Bank (1994), and Holtmann and Mommartz
(1996) do use this definition implicitly by removing grants accounted for as revenue from their
definition of P. Most users of Yaron’s (1992a) formula either set K equal to zero or to Discounts t t
on other operating expenses. If there were grants recorded as revenue in period t, then these SDI s t
T
are wrong. Many DFIs, especially microfinance NGOs, have some grants accounted for as revenue.
Without the definition of K in (11), all the forms of subsidized resources would not enter the t
subsidy formula symmetrically, so the measured subsidy would depend on arbitrary decisions by
donors and/or accountants. This is bad because the economic cost of the use of a unit of subsidized
resources are the same regardless of the form of the subsidized resources.
The definition of K in (11) makes measured subsidy invariant to how the DFI received t
subsidized resources. All forms of subsidized resources received before period t are multiplied by m , et
and all forms of subsidized resources received in period t are multiplied by (m /2). Combining (11) et





(True profitsi % Four new sub. rsrc.t) %




t – True profitt.
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(12)
The first two lines of (12) are the opportunity cost of the subsidized equity used by DFI in the
period. The last line is the amount the DFI could have paid for its subsidized resources if true profits
were to be zero. In the traditional framework, a positive compensated subsidy implies financial self-
sufficiency.
3.5 Strengths of the reformulation of the traditional measure of subsidy
The reformulation in (12) has at least five strengths compared to the traditional formula in (2).
The first strength is to show the invariance of the framework to the way a DFI receives subsidized
resources. Grants accounted for as revenue and grants accounted for as equity do not appear
explicitly in (2) but rather slither in by their effects on equity. K appears in (2) even though it is not t
subsidy but rather subsidized resources and even though it is not clearly defined. Likewise, A@(m t dt
– c) appears in (2) even though it stands not for subsidies but rather for subsidized resources. The t
reformulation shows that the subsidy is the opportunity cost of subsidized resources multiplied by the
subsidized resources used in the period.
The second strength of the reformulation is to show that although the opportunity cost of debt
m  matters for the discount on subsidized debt, the opportunity cost of this discount is m . It is not dt et
obvious in (2) that all forms of subsidized resources have the same opportunity cost.
The third strength of the reformulation is to show that compensated subsidy is the difference
between subsidy and profits without subsidy. In contrast to the appearance of (2), subsidy is not
A@(m  – c) + SE @m  + K. Nor are profits without subsidy P. t dt t t et t t
T
The fourth strength of the reformulation is to show the that there is an opportunity cost on
the profits without subsidy earned in period t itself. This is not obvious in (2).
The fifth strength of the reformulation is to show how subsidized resources received in
previous periods still have an opportunity cost in the current period. This is in the traditional
framework, but it is buried.
Section 4 shows and fixes two big mistakes in the traditional framework as embodied in (12).
First, the traditional framework wrongly counts negative profits and negative retained earnings as
negative subsidized resources. Second, the traditional framework fails to capitalize subsidies.
Subsidies should be capitalized because they are implicit injections of equity.St ’ met @j
t &1
i ’1
(True profitsi % Four new sub. rsrc.i) %
(met/2)@[Max(0, True profitst ) % Four new sub. rsrc.t].
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4. The Modified Framework
4.1 Negative true profits are not negative subsidized resources
(12) shows that there is an opportunity cost on True profits in the period itself. This hints at t
a problem. If profits in a period are positive, having an opportunity cost makes sense. The owners
of the DFI could have claimed these profits as they were earned. Instead, the owners let the DFI keep
using them. This is like an injection of equity.
But if profits are negative, then having an opportunity cost does not make sense. Negative
profits are not claims by the DFI on owners. Negative profits do not decrease the investment owners
had made in the DFI.
Suppose a donor grants $100 to a new DFI as equity. In the first period, the DFI makes a true
profit of -$100. Even though the DFI would have paid $100@m  if it did not have subsidized equity, et
there is no change in subsidized resources by the traditional measure in (12). Thus the traditional
measure of subsidy received in the period by the DFI, S , is zero. t
T
This estimate of S  is wrong. It should be at least $100@m . Even the traditional measure of t et
T
compensated subsidy, CS , is wrong. CS  is just $100, but if the DFI bought everything on the t t
T T
market, it would need at least $100 + $100@m  more profits just to break even. et
If profits are positive, they are subsidized resources. But if profits are negative, they are not
negative subsidized resources. To avoid unnecessarily underestimating subsidy and thereby
overestimating financial self-sufficiency, True profits in the subsidy part of (12) should be replaced t
with Max(0, True profits): t
(13)
In practice, (13) is not the same as (12) because the usual case is true profits to be negative.
But (13) is true to the logic of the traditional framework. This modification means that subsidized
equity will be more than total equity if True profits is negative. This may seem odd, but it makes t
sense. In the example above, the owners had a claim on the DFI worth $100 even though total
accounting equity was zero. If the DFI were capitalized privately, investors would still expect a
periodic return of at least m  in the long run regardless of the level of accounting equity in the short et
run. This modification increases subsidized equity and so increases the estimate of subsidy and
decreases the estimate of financial self-sufficiency.
Without subsidies, retained earnings would be the sum of true profits in previous periods. The
sum of true profits in previous periods is the sum of accounting profits in previous periods less
accumulated transfers of other subsidized resources, so actual retained earnings are the sum of true
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Positive retained earnings are claims on the DFI by owners. If the owners let the DFI keep
using these resources, then retained earnings are an implicit equity injection with an opportunity cost.
The logic of the traditional framework suggests that negative retained earnings are not negative
subsidized resources. Negative retained earnings are not claims by the DFI on owners and they have
no opportunity cost. They do not change the investment owners made in the DFI.
To avoid unnecessarily underestimating subsidy and thereby overestimating financial self-
sufficiency, the summation of True profits in (13) should be replaced with: i
giving:
(13')
If the summation of true profits in the past is negative, then subsidized equity used in the
period could be more than total equity even if True profits is positive. t
4.2 There are subsidies on subsidized resources from subsidies in the current period
S' in (13') ignores subsidies from subsidized resources made by subsidies in period t. If a DFI t
paid market rates for its resources, it would have to get more market resources to replace those lost
in payments, and those resources would make still more costs to be paid.
This means that subsidies S' should be on the right side of equation (13'). To keep invariance, t
S' should appear symmetrically with the other subsidized resources received by the DFI in period t: t
Solving for S' gives the modified short-run measure of subsidy, S : t t
MS
(14)
The factor [2/(2 – m )] is more than one as long as m  < 2. This is the normal case, so subsidy et et
is increased by including subsidized resources made by subsidies in the period. The modified short-run
compensated subsidy CS  is S  less True profits. The SDI  is a short-run measure. Its modified t t t
MS MS T
counterpart is SDI , the ratio of CS  over Revenue from lending. t t t

























A DFI is financially self-sufficient in the short run if it could have compensated society for the
subsidies it received and still had a positive true profit:
(15)
In this case, the SDI  will be non-positive. This implies that, all else unchanged, the DFI t
MS
could buy all its resources on the market and still break even even if it decreased the average on-
lending interest rate. Financial self-sufficiency in the short-run is probably sufficient, but not
necessary, for the social benefits of DFI to be more than its social costs from that period on. 
The modified measure of subsidy is bigger than the traditional measure for three reasons. First,
it does not count negative true profits in the current period as negative subsidized resources. Second,
it does not count a negative sum of true profits in previous periods as negative subsidized resources.
Third, it does not ignore subsidized resources created by subsidies in the period.
4.3 There are subsidies on subsidized resources from subsidies in past periods
The SDI  pretends that the DFI has repaid society for subsidies received in past periods. t
MS
Most DFIs do not do this. Past subsidies were equity injections that still have an opportunity cost.
If a DFI bought its resources on the market, it would have to pay, in the long-run, a return equal to
what those resources could have earned for their owners elsewhere.
A long-run measure of subsidy S  in period t would include the subsidy received in periods t
ML
1 ... t-1 on the right side of equation (14), symmetrically with the other subsidized resources received
by the DFI in past periods:
(16)
Including subsidized resources from subsidies in past periods increases measured subsidy. The
modified long-run compensated subsidy CS  is S  less True profits. The ratio of CS  over t t t t
ML ML ML
Revenue from lending is not very useful. It does not make much sense for a DFI to raise interest rates t
in a single period enough to earn enough to repay past subsidies.
A DFI is financially self-sufficient in the long run if:
(17)
In this case, the DFI will have so much retained earnings that it could be liquidated and still
pay for its subsidies and give back to society all its subsidized resources. The DFI that is financially
self-sufficient in the long run could pay its debt to society."t ’
Closing cap. grantst
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Long-run financial self-sufficiency is more difficult than short-run financial self-sufficiency.
Like short-run financial self-sufficiency, long-run financial self-sufficiency is sufficient, but not
necessary, for the social benefits of DFI to be more than its social costs, including costs in the past.
4.4 How to find subsidy with private owners and/or with dividends
Although most DFIs do not have private owners nor do they pay dividends, some of the most
important DFIs do. For example, members of the Grameen Bank own most of its shares (Hashemi,
1997).
Dividends paid by a DFI to donors at the end of a period compensate society for the use of
its resources. Dividends decrease equity by decreasing retained earnings. The share of dividends paid
to society corresponds to society’s share of paid-in equity and grants accounted for as equity at the
close of the period:
(18)
Dividends are declared at the close of the period. Private owners have a claim on positive
profits and on positive retained earnings. The share of positive profits and retained earnings belonging
to society is the share of the average resources entrusted to the DFI by donors to the average
resources entrusted to the DFI from all sources:
(19)
The modified measure of subsidy with private owners is then:
(20)
The modified measure of compensated subsidy with private owners is:
(21)Dt ’
2@a % St
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(19) and (20) are two equations in two unknowns, D and S. If there are no private owners, t t
then )Paid-in capital is zero and D is unity by definition. Even if there are private owners, if True t t
profit is negative, then D vanishes from the right-hand sides of both (19) and (20) and D is easy to t t t
find. This is the usual case. If there are also no dividends, then (20) is (16).
If there are private owners and True profit is positive, then (19) can be solved for D in terms t t
of the unknown S. Then (20) can be solved numerically for S and the solution can be plugged into t t
(19) to get D for use in future periods: t
where
The traditional measures of subsidy in Section 5 below do not adjust for private ownership.
This overestimates subsidy but make the numbers comparable to previous calculations (e.g.,
Khandker, 1995).
4.5 Notes on the use of the modified measures of subsidy
Both of the modified measures are of subsidy are, like the traditional measures, lower bounds.
But they are higher lower bounds.
Both of the modified measures of subsidy can inform some questions. For example, managers
of a DFI can stop bothering with donors once the DFI is financially self-sufficient in the short-run.
A private investor would selfishly invest in starting a similar organization from scratch only
if a DFI is expected to be financially self-sufficient in the long run. A private investor would selfishly
invest in an existing DFI only if it is already financially self-sufficient in the short-run.19
Donors can use the measures as comparative tools. Both the short-run and the long-run
measures can help allocate resources earmarked for development finance. Donors should expect more
output in the present from DFIs who used up more inputs in the past.
The measure of subsidy can also be turned into a measure of social cost. The opportunity cost
of equity m  could be defined as the opportunity cost of resources from the point of view of the et
donor with alternative development investments. It could also be seen as the opportunity cost of
resources from the point of view of the taxpayers with other uses for their money.
5. Application
This section measures subsidy with the traditional and modified frameworks for the Grameen
Bank of Bangladesh and for Caja los Andes, a microfinance NGO in Bolivia. The traditional and
modified estimates differ a lot. The two DFIs are much less financially self-sufficient than was
thought.
This section also uses the modified subsidy from the point of view of society in a donor
leverage ratio, in a donor output ratio, and in a pseudo-benefit-cost analysis. Both DFIs probably
have social benefits that are more than their social costs.
5.1 The donor leverage ratio
Rosenberg (1994) conceived the idea of donor leverage. He reasoned that if development
finance for the poor can be financially self-sufficient and if donors do not have enough funds to
saturate the market, then donors should focus on leveraging private funds.
To be useful, donor leverage must be measured. Schreiner and González-Vega (1995) and
Rosenberg et al. (1997) used the ratio of the average non-subsidized resources used in a period over
the average subsidized resources used in a period. If S  is the modified measure of subsidy in the t
MLS
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The DLR shows how the performance of the DFI has enabled and motivated the use of t
market resources. If the goal of society is to saturate the market, the donors should act so as to
maximize the DLR. But the goal of society is not to saturate the market; the goal of society is to t
maximize social welfare. Maximizing the DLR is good only inasmuch as attracting private funds to t
development finance helps maximize social welfare. Attracting private funds is good if it increases
the number and the volume of voluntary transactions between DFIs and clients. More voluntary
transactions are good because, at least in expectation and at least for those choosing to transact, the
benefits of voluntary transactions are always more than the costs. The benefits of involuntary, non-
market transactions are not always more than the costs, even in expectation, which is why subsidy
must be measured in the first place.
The idea of a DLR  has at least two weaknesses. First, the DLR looks only at resources t  t
entrusted to DFIs by donors. Second, the DLR ignores both the benefits of the resources and the t
costs of the resources.
5.2 The donor output ratio
Benefits are the difference in the utility of the clients with and without the DFI. While benefits
are undoubtedly more than costs, measuring benefits is costly (Von Pischke and Adams, 1980; David
and Meyer, 1980). Still, on average, the monetary value of the benefits is a multiple of the average
debt in the hands of clients in a period. Average debt is cheap to measure.
The donor output ratio compares social costs to a fraction of social benefits. The DOR is the t
ratio of LP, the average net loan portfolio, over S , the cost to society of the resources it entrusted t t
ML
to the DFI:
The DOR is a multiple of a benefit-cost ratio without discounting. It measures how much debt t














buck, but it does not tell exactly how much more. The period could be of any length, including the
life of the DFI, but the monetary figures must be in units of a constant currency.
The reciprocal of the DOR is the cost to society per dollar-year of debt held by the poor. In t
the long run, it shows the efficiency of the DFI in using society’s resources to increase the welfare
of the target group.
5.3 Pseudo-benefit-cost analysis
The idea of pseudo-benefit-cost analysis recognizes that the goal of development finance is
to maximize the difference between social benefits and social costs. Pseudo-benefit-cost analysis also
recognizes that it is cheap to measure social costs but costly to measure social benefits. The benefits
of a full-blown benefit-cost analysis probably are more than the costs, but the benefits of a pseudo-
benefit-cost analysis probably are less than the costs.
Subsidies are a lower bound on social costs. On average, benefits are an unknown multiple
b of the average debt held by the poor. The average debtor gets an average surplus worth b for each
dollar-year of debt from a DFI.
Pseudo-benefit-cost analysis looks at what b would have to be to make the discounted value
of benefits more than the discounted value of costs. Weights could be used since benefits accrue to
poor people in low-income countries but costs accrue to rich people in high-income countries. Given
the modified long-run subsidy in each period from the point of view of society and the average loan
portfolio in units of a constant currency, if w  and w  are the weights for the rich and the poor and * r p
is the discount rate, then:
If b is small, then subsidizing the DFI probably has increased social welfare. A benefit-cost
analysis at time 0 with the knowledge at time T would probably have found that the DFI was a
worthwhile investment of scarce resources from the point of view of society.
How small is small needs human discussion. Discussion and sensitivity analysis are also
needed to pick good values for the weights and the discount rate. Since S  is a lower bound on t
ML
costs, b is a lower bound on required surplus.
For some DFIs, there are estimates of the marginal product of capital for borrowers with the
Grameen Bank. The lower bound on required surplus b can be compared to the difference between
these estimates and the effective interest rates plus transactions costs for the borrower (Schreiner,
1997). In addition, b can be compared to the difference between the cost of debt from a DFI and the
cost of similar debt from other sources. This difference is a lower bound on the debtor’s surplus.22
Usually, however, people will just have to judge whether b is so small that the debtor’s surplus is
likely to be more.
5.4 Application to the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh
The Grameen Bank of Bangladesh has spawned much fervor for development finance. Began
as a pilot project in 1976, Grameen was chartered as a bank in 1983. By 1995, it had branches in
about 35,500 villages, more than half the villages in Bangladesh. It has more than 2 million borrowers,
more than 90 percent of whom are women (Hashemi, 1997). Grameen holds savings for its members,
and members own most of the bank’s shares. Assets at the end of 1994 were about $400 million.
Grameen disburses loans through groups of borrowers without collateral. Financial services
are coupled with teaching economic and social discipline (Khandker et al., 1995). Most members own
less than half a hectare of land and have assets worth less than the value of one hectare. The members
are poor by any standard, but they are not the poorest of the poor in Bangladesh. The poorest of the
poor would burdened by debt, not benefitted (Hashemi, 1997).
Many studies have estimated the SDI of Grameen (e.g., Hashemi, 1997; Morduch, 1997;
Khandker et al., 1995; Christen et al., 1995; Benjamin, 1994; Yaron, 1994 and 1992a;). Even
Hossain (1988) estimated subsidy. The estimates here span from 1983 to 1994 and use the modified
framework. Technical notes are in Appendix 2.
Table 1 shows that true profit has been negative every year even though accounting profit has
been negative only twice. Table 2 shows that about two-thirds of Grameen’s funds were subsidized
by 1994. Table 3 shows that, ignoring 1983, the traditional SDI fell from a high of 168 percent in
1989 to 20 percent in 1994. Grameen had an average on-lending interest rate between 12 and 19
percent over this period, ending at 17 percent in 1994. The rate required for a traditional SDI of zero
ranged from 19 percent to 35 percent, ending at 20 percent in 1994.
With the traditional SDI, the Grameen Bank looks efficient. An annual interest rate of 20
percent is low given the costs of making small loans to poor people. The rate charged is only 3
percentage points from the subsidy-free rate.
The modified short-run SDI in Table 4 is bigger because it does not ignore the fact that
subsidies received in the current period make subsidized resources and so more subsidies in the
current period. The SDI  falls from a high of 201 percent in 1990 to 27 percent in 1994. Grameen
MS
would have to increase its interest rate from 17 percent to 21 percent in 1994. Still, this is not a big
jump, and 21 percent is still low for a lender to the poor.
The modified long-run measure of subsidy in Table 4 is even bigger than the modified short-
run measure of subsidy because it does not ignore the fact that subsidies received in previous periods
make subsidized resources and so more subsidies in the current period. In 1994, the difference
between S  and S  was about taka 128 million. With an exchange rate of about 40 taka per dollar,
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this is about $3.2 million. The assumed opportunity cost took a nose dive from 13 percent to 6
percent between 1993 and 1994 (Table 13), so the difference in 1993 is bigger at about taka 182
million, or about $4.5 million.
The modified measures of subsidy from the point of view of society are in Table 5. They differ
from the measures from the point of view of the DFI in that the opportunity cost of both debt and
equity was assumed to be 10 percent in each period (Table 13). Thus the subsidy from the point of
view of society is smaller than the subsidy from the point of view of the DFI in all years except 1994.
Subsidizing Grameen in 1994 cost society about taka 817 million, or about $20 million. In 1993, it
cost about taka 939 million, or about $23.5 million.
Table 6 summarizes the subsidy measures in units of millions of dollars as of Dec. 31, 1994.
From the point of view of the DFI, the traditional subsidy was about $9 million in 1993 and about $5
million in 1994. The modified short-run subsidy was bigger at about $16 million in 1993 and $8
million in 1994. The modified long-run subsidy was even bigger at abut $20 million in 1993 and about
$12 million in 1994.
Summing the modified long-run measure over time shows that Grameen would have had to
pay at least $70 million more between 1983 and 1994 to keep the same level of service without
subsidized resources. This is $42 million more than the traditional estimate.
Table 6 shows that it cost society at least $58 million to subsidize Grameen from 1983 to
1994. Was it worth it? The DLR, DOR, and pseudo-benefit-cost analysis in Table 6 address this.
The long-run DLR of 0.39 in 1994 means that Grameen used one dollar-year of market
resources for every 2.5 dollar-years of subsidized resources entrusted to it by society. Even though
the DLR has been falling, its level is not too good. Grameen does not use many market resources.
It has not leveraged the $0.99 billion dollar-years of resources entrusted to it much.
The long-run DOR of 2.0 in 1994 means that Grameen put one dollar-year of debt in the
hands of poor people for each 50 cents of cost to society. This seems like a lot, and the DOR
worsened until 1994 as the portfolio, starting with 58,000 borrowers in 1983 (Hashemi, 1997), grew
slower than subsidy, assumed to start at zero. The estimated social cost of 50 cents per dollar-year
of debt does not include the interest costs paid by borrowers nor the transactions costs they bear. It
is a matter for debate whether Grameen borrowers could benefit from debt even if they paid society
for its costs, and thus whether subsidizing Grameen has been worthwhile.
Pseudo-benefit-cost analysis can inform the debate. Looking from the point of view of society
in 1983 at the results through 1994, the discounted benefits to borrowers would have been more than
the discounted costs to society if the average surplus of the average borrower per dollar-year of debt
(b) was more than about 7 cents (Table 6). This is not much, although b increased until 1994 for the
same reasons the DOR increased.24
This estimate of b is somewhat sensitive to the assumed discount rate and opportunity cost.
For example, if the discount rate is left at 5 percent but the opportunity cost of society is changed to
20 percent, then b is 19 percent. If the discount rate is set to zero with the opportunity cost set to 10
percent, then b is also 19 percent. If both the discount rate and the opportunity cost are 3 percent,
then b is 2 percent.
Grameen is not financially self-sufficient, neither in the short run nor in the long run. True
profits are negative in all periods, and subsidies are always positive. Accumulated true profits are
about -$58 million in constant 1994 dollars, whereas accumulated subsidy from the point of view of
society is, coincidentally, about $58 million. Grameen is not yet financially self-sufficient in the short
run, and it probably will never be financially self-sufficient in the long run.
Yet Grameen may have been worthwhile. So there is both bad news and good news. The bad
news is that Grameen does not yet get much of its funding from the market and that Grameen would
have been a bad investment for a venture capitalist in 1983. The good news is that Grameen probably
has increased social welfare. With slightly higher interest rates, Grameen could attract private
investors beyond its own members.
5.5 Application to Caja los Andes, a microfinance NGO in Bolivia
Caja los Andes was founded in Bolivia as a microfinance NGO in 1992. Andes was called Pro-
Crédito until 1995, the year it got a charter that subjected it to prudential regulation and that let it
mobilize deposits. By the end of 1995, Andes had 8 branches with about 14,000 borrowers, about
60 percent of whom were women. Assets were about $6.6 million (González-Vega et al., 1997b).
Andes disburses loans to individuals with collateral. Andes does not offer non-financial
services. Borrowers of Andes are poor, but they are not the poorest of the poor in Bolivia. Three-
fourths of borrowers from Andes in La Paz are in the top two quintiles of an index of basic-needs
achievement (Navajas et al., 1996). Andes competes with BancoSol, a bigger, more famous DFI that
lends through groups (González-Vega et al., 1997a). 
González-Vega et al. (1997b) estimated the traditional SDI for Andes. Technical notes are
in Appendix 3.
Table 7 shows that true profit has been always been negative even though accounting profit
has always been positive. Table 8 shows that about 95 percent of Andes’ liabilities and equity were
subsidized by 1995. Table 9 shows that the traditional SDI had fallen from 211 percent in 1992 to
93 percent in 1995. The average on-lending interest rate also fell over this period, from 47 percent
to 23 percent. The rate required for a traditional SDI of zero fell from 148 percent to 43 percent. To
double the interest rate in 1995 is less severe than it sounds because the base to be doubled is only
about 20 percentage points.25
Andes would look financially self-sufficient in the traditional framework if it charged the same
interest rate in 1995 that it charged in 1992. This suggests that Andes has a positive SDI  not because
T
of inefficiency but because of its interest-rate policy.
The modified short-run measure of subsidy in Table 10 is bigger because it does not ignore
subsidized resources made by subsidies in the current period. The SDI  falls from 236 percent in
MS
1992 to 125 percent in 1995.
The modified long-run measure of subsidy in Table 10 is even bigger than the modified short-
run measure because it does not ignore subsidized resources made by subsidies received in past
periods. In 1995, the difference was about Bs 1 million. With an exchange rate of about 5 bolivianos
per dollar, this is about $200,000.
The modified measures of subsidy from the point of view of society are in Table 11. They
differ from the measures from the point of view of the DFI in that the opportunity cost of both debt
and equity was assumed to be 10 percent in each period (Table 14). Thus the subsidy from the point
of view of society is smaller than the subsidy from the point of view of the DFI in all years.
Subsidizing Andes cost society about Bs 1.8 million in 1995, or about $360,000.
Table 12 summarizes the subsidy measures in units of millions of dollars as of Dec. 31, 1995.
From the point of view of the DFI, the traditional subsidy was about $356,000 in 1995. The modified
short-run subsidy was bigger at about $692,000, and the modified long-run subsidy was even bigger
at about $909,000.
Summing the modified long-run measure over time shows that Andes would have had to pay
at least $2 million more between 1992 and 1995 if it had kept the same level of service without
subsidized resources. This is about $1 million more than the traditional estimate.
From the point of view of society, it cost at least $890,000 to subsidize Andes from 1992 to
1995 (Table 12). The DLR, DOR, and pseudo-benefit-cost analysis in Table 12 address whether this
cost was worthwhile.
The long-run DLR of 0.06 in 1995 means that Grameen used one dollar-year of market
resources for each 17 dollar-years of subsidized resources entrusted to it by society. This is not very
good. By 1995, Andes has not leveraged funds from the market with the $11.3 million dollar-years
of resources entrusted to it.
The long-run DOR of 2.9 in 1995 means that Andes put one dollar-year of debt in the hands
of poor people for every 34 cents of cost to society. Unlike Grameen, Andes has grown the loan
portfolio faster than subsidies, so the DOR is increasing. The estimated social cost of 34 cents per
dollar-year of debt does not include the interest costs paid by borrowers nor the transactions costs
they bear.26
Pseudo-benefit-cost analysis can inform the debate about whether subsidizing Andes has been
worthwhile. From the point of view of society in 1992 with knowledge of the results through 1995,
the discounted benefits to borrowers would have been more than the discounted costs to society if
the average surplus of the average borrower per dollar-year of debt (b) was more than about 10 cents
(Table 12). This is not very much, and b is falling.
This estimate of b is somewhat sensitive to the assumed discount rate and opportunity cost.
For example, if the discount rate is left at 5 percent but the opportunity cost of society is changed to
20 percent, then b is 24 percent. If the discount rate is set to zero with the opportunity cost set to 10
percent, then b is 10 percent. If both the discount rate and the opportunity cost are 3 percent, then
b is 3 percent.
Andes is not financially self-sufficient, neither in the short run nor in the long run. True profits
are negative in all periods, and subsidies are always positive. Accumulated true profits are about -$1.9
million in constant 1995 dollars, whereas accumulated subsidy from the point of view of society is
about $0.9 million.
Still, Andes may have been worthwhile. Subsidizing Andes probably has increased social
welfare even though Andes gets little funds from the market and even though Andes would not have
been a good investment in 1992. Andes could attract private investors if it increase its interest rates.
5.6 Concluding thoughts
The examples show that there can be a big difference between the subsidy under the
traditional and modified framework. There is no reason, other than tradition, not to use the modified
framework. Both frameworks use the same data, and both are easy to compute. The spreadsheets
used here are available on request.
The modified long-run measure does use historical data, but it is still a higher lower bound
than the traditional measure even if past data is not at hand. Even the short-term modified measure
is a higher lower bound than the traditional measure. The real work in both frameworks is in judging
opportunity costs, ferreting out discounts on operating expenses, and analyzing the results. The
modified framework could be used not only for DFIs but also for any subsidized organization that
wants to escape from dependence on donors. 
The expenses of a subsidized DFI are not the same as the costs the DFI would pay if it had
to survive in the market. The difference between these costs and expenses is subsidy. The modified
framework measures costs better because it measures subsidies better.
There can be is a big difference between the traditional and the modified measures. For the
Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, the difference is of the order of $42 million, 150 percent the size of
the traditional measure.27
Two the best DFIs are much worse than was thought because their costs are higher than was
thought. This is true both from the point of view of the DFI and from the point of view of society.
But pseudo-benefit-cost analysis suggests that at least two of the best DFIs have probably improved
social welfare.
A DFI can be socially worthwhile even if it is not financially self-sufficient. But short-run
financial self-sufficiency is still needed to attract private capital to expand existing DFIs. Long-run
financial self-sufficiency is needed to attract private capital to start DFIs from scratch so as to expand
development finance to more than a fraction of the poor in the world.Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Organization
31-Dec-94 31-Dec-93 31-Dec-92 31-Dec-91 31-Dec-90 31-Dec-89 31-Dec-88 31-Dec-87 31-Dec-86 31-Dec-85 31-Dec-84 31-Dec-83 For the year ending
1,646 1,056 522 337 221 162 113 65 44 35 23 0 Rev. lending
296 183 188 143 117 77 53 61 46 31 13 1 Rev. other op.
1,942 1,238 710 480 338 239 166 126 90 66 36 1     Rev. op.
76 87 62 73 76 60 34 3 0 0 0 0 Grants as rev.
2,019 1,325 772 553 414 299 200 129 90 66 36 1     Total rev.
617 587 295 270 265 222 159 122 51 31 22 6 True exp. sub. debt
(95) (351) (206) (219) (217) (183) (131) (99) (28) (5) (8) (5) (Discount sub. debt)
523 235 89 50 48 39 28 22 24 26 14 1     Exp. sub. debt
1,474 1,080 689 490 356 257 171 106 66 40 17 3 True exp. other op.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (Discount other op.)
1,474 1,080 689 490 356 257 171 106 66 40 17 3     Exp. other op.
1,997 1,316 778 540 404 296 198 128 90 65 31 4     Total exp.
22 9 (6) 13 10 3 1 0 0 1 5 (3)     Acct. profit
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (Dividends)
22 9 (6) 13 10 3 1 0 0 1 5 (3)     Change R.E.
1,942 1,238 710 480 338 239 166 126 90 66 36 1 Memo: Rev. op.
(617) (587) (295) (270) (265) (222) (159) (122) (51) (31) (22) (6) Memo: (True exp. sub. debt)
(1,474) (1,080) (689) (490) (356) (257) (171) (106) (66) (40) (17) (3) Memo: (True exp. other op.)
(150) (429) (274) (280) (283) (239) (164) (102) (27) (5) (3) (8)     Memo: True profit
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Table 1: Stylized income statement for Grameen
Source: Hashemi (1997) and Khandker et al. (1995). Figures in millions of nominal taka.Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Organization
31-Dec-94 31-Dec-93 31-Dec-92 31-Dec-91 31-Dec-90 31-Dec-89 31-Dec-88 31-Dec-87 31-Dec-86 31-Dec-85 31-Dec-84 31-Dec-83 For the year ending
Assets
11,054 8,764 4,424 2,551 2,117 1,593 1,095 634 331 246 178 74 Net loan portfolio
5,091 3,513 2,460 2,290 1,846 1,317 816 646 572 300 199 45 Other assets
16,145 12,277 6,884 4,841 3,964 2,911 1,911 1,279 903 546 377 119     Total assets
Liabilities
8,216 5,470 1,878 1,876 1,887 1,720 1,233 955 717 434 311 85 Sub. debt
2,808 1,955 1,199 835 643 445 293 190 117 80 38 19 Dep. by poor
1,534 1,824 1,252 729 462 360 178 85 25 0 0 0 Other libs.
12,557 9,249 4,329 3,440 2,991 2,525 1,704 1,230 859 514 350 104     Total libs.
Equity
150 149 114 72 72 57 42 35 30 25 18 0 Open. paid-in cap.
67 1 35 42 0 15 15 7 5 5 7 18 Change paid-in cap.
217 150 149 114 72 72 57 42 35 30 25 18     Close. paid-in cap.
2,793 2,359 1,247 874 300 142 1 3 (2) (1) 0 0 Open. cap. grants
458 435 1,111 374 574 158 141 (2) 5 (1) (1) 0 Grants as equity
3,252 2,793 2,359 1,247 874 300 142 1 3 (2) (1) 0     Close. cap. grants
84 47 39 26 13 8 6 5 4 3 (3) 0 Open. R.E.
36 37 8 13 13 5 2 1 1 1 6 (3) Change R.E.
120 84 47 39 26 13 8 6 5 4 3 (3)     Close R.E.
3,588 3,028 2,555 1,401 972 385 207 49 44 32 27 15         Total equity
16,145 12,277 6,884 4,841 3,964 2,911 1,911 1,279 903 546 377 119         Total libs. and equity
2,381 1,577 1,017 739 544 369 242 153 98 59 28 9 Memo: Ave. dep. by poor
8,176 6,245 4,243 3,245 2,521 1,728 1,083 821 358 217 156 43 Memo: Ave. sub. libs.
9,969 6,561 3,529 2,334 1,855 1,344 864 482 288 212 126 37 Memo: Ave. net loan port.
29
Table 2: Stylized balance sheet for Grameen
Source: Hashemi (1997) and Khandker et al. (1995). Figures in millions of nominal taka.Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Organization
31-Dec-94 31-Dec-93 31-Dec-92 31-Dec-91 31-Dec-90 31-Dec-89 31-Dec-88 31-Dec-87 31-Dec-86 31-Dec-85 31-Dec-84 31-Dec-83 For the year ending
76 87 62 73 76 60 34 3 0 0 0 0 Grants as rev.
458 435 1,111 374 574 158 141 (2) 5 (1) (1) 0 Grants as equity
95 351 206 219 217 183 131 99 28 5 8 5 Disc. sub. debt
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Disc. other op.
629 873 1,379 666 867 400 306 100 33 5 7 5     4 forms new sub. rsrc.
4,642 3,768 2,389 1,723 856 456 149 49 16 12 5 0     Open. accum. new sub.
(150) (429) (274) (280) (283) (239) (164) (102) (27) (5) (3) (8) True profit
(1,814) (1,385) (1,111) (831) (548) (309) (145) (43) (16) (11) (8) 0     Open. accum. true profit
184 339 238 149 84 32 11 1 0 0 (0) (0) Trad. subsidy
334 768 512 429 367 272 175 103 28 5 3 8 Trad. comp. subsidy
20% 73% 98% 127% 166% 168% 155% 158% 63% 14% 12% 3982% Trad SDI
17% 16% 15% 14% 12% 12% 13% 13% 15% 17% 19% 1% On-lending I.R.
20% 28% 29% 33% 32% 32% 33% 35% 25% 19% 21% 22% Subsidy-free on-lending I.R.
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Table 3: Trad. SDI for Grameen for DFI
Figures in millions of nominal taka.Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Organization
31-Dec-94 31-Dec-93 31-Dec-92 31-Dec-91 31-Dec-90 31-Dec-89 31-Dec-88 31-Dec-87 31-Dec-86 31-Dec-85 31-Dec-84 31-Dec-83 For the year ending
76 87 62 73 76 60 34 3 0 0 0 0 Grants as rev.
458 435 1,111 374 574 158 141 (2) 5 (1) (1) 0 Grants as equity
95 351 206 219 217 183 131 99 28 5 8 5 Disc. sub. debt
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Disc. other op.
629 873 1,379 666 867 400 306 100 33 5 7 5     4 new sub. rsrc.
4,642 3,768 2,389 1,723 856 456 149 49 16 12 5 0     Open. accum. new sub.
(150) (429) (274) (280) (283) (239) (164) (102) (27) (5) (3) (8) True profit
(1,814) (1,385) (1,111) (831) (548) (309) (145) (43) (16) (11) (8) 0     Open. accum. true profit
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Dividends
0.938 0.949 0.940 0.916 0.924 0.807 0.714 0.023 0.079 (0.071) (0.054) 0.006 Alpha
0.974 0.974 0.968 0.965 0.956 0.923 0.876 0.749 0.545 0.380 0.305 0.233 Rho short-run
0.975 0.975 0.969 0.966 0.957 0.925 0.877 0.752 0.549 0.382 0.305 0.233 Rho long-run
1,682 1,097 669 365 171 71 24 9 4 2 0 0 Open. accum. short-run sub.
307 585 428 304 194 101 46 15 5 2 1 0 Mod. short-run sub.
452 1,003 693 574 464 322 190 92 20 4 2 2 Mod. short-run comp. sub.
27% 95% 133% 170% 210% 199% 169% 141% 45% 11% 9% 1149% Mod. short-run SDI
17% 16% 15% 14% 12% 12% 13% 13% 15% 17% 19% 1% On-lending I.R.
21% 31% 34% 39% 37% 36% 35% 32% 22% 18% 20% 7% Subsidy-free on-lending I.R.
2,080 1,313 777 412 190 77 27 10 4 2 0 0 Open accum. long-run sub.
435 767 536 364 223 112 51 17 6 2 1 0 Mod. long-run sub.
581 1,186 801 635 493 334 194 93 21 4 2 2 Mod. long-run comp. sub.
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Table 4: Mod. SDI for Grameen for DFI
Figures in millions of nominal taka.Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Organization
31-Dec-94 31-Dec-93 31-Dec-92 31-Dec-91 31-Dec-90 31-Dec-89 31-Dec-88 31-Dec-87 31-Dec-86 31-Dec-85 31-Dec-84 31-Dec-83 For the year ending
0.972 0.972 0.966 0.963 0.953 0.920 0.871 0.740 0.532 0.367 0.297 0.229 Rho short-run
0.973 0.973 0.966 0.963 0.954 0.920 0.872 0.742 0.534 0.369 0.298 0.229 Rho long-run
1,236 794 470 253 117 48 17 6 3 1 0 0 Open. accum. short-run sub.
522 443 324 216 136 69 32 10 3 1 1 0 Mod. short-run sub.
667 860 588 486 405 289 175 86 18 3 2 2 Mod. short-run comp. sub.
1,436 899 520 275 126 51 18 7 3 1 0 0 Open accum. long-run sub.
673 537 379 245 149 74 34 11 4 2 1 0 Mod. long-run sub.
819 955 643 515 419 295 177 87 18 3 2 2 Mod. long-run comp. sub.
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Table 5: Mod. subsidy for Grameen for society
Figures in millions of nominal taka.Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Organization
31-Dec-94 31-Dec-93 31-Dec-92 31-Dec-91 31-Dec-90 31-Dec-89 31-Dec-88 31-Dec-87 31-Dec-86 31-Dec-85 31-Dec-84 31-Dec-83 For the year ending
266 175 94 65 55 43 30 18 12 10 6 2 $-years debt in period
776 511 336 242 177 122 78 48 30 18 8 2 Accum. $-years debt
Point of view of DFI
5 9 6 4 3 1 0 0 0 0 (0) (0) Trad. subsidy
8 16 11 8 6 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 Mod. short-run sub.
12 20 14 10 7 4 2 1 0 0 0 0 Mod. long-run sub.
28 23 14 8 4 1 0 0 0 (0) (0) (0) Accum. trad. sub.
55 47 31 20 12 6 3 1 0 0 0 0 Acc. mod. short-run sub.
70 58 38 23 13 6 3 1 0 0 0 0 Acc. mod. long-run sub.
Point of view of society
14 12 9 6 4 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 Mod. short-run sub.
18 14 10 7 4 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 Mod. long-run sub.
58 40 26 16 9 4 2 1 0 0 0 0 Acc. mod. long-run sub.
0.39 0.38 0.36 0.35 0.37 0.44 0.48 0.47 0.66 0.70 0.58 0.76 Short-run DLR
0.39 0.39 0.39 0.41 0.44 0.49 0.53 0.57 0.66 0.66 0.62 0.76 Long-run DLR
2.4 2.0 1.4 1.4 1.5 2.2 3.3 5.8 11.7 21.8 25.6 0.7 Short-run DOR
2.0 1.9 1.8 2.1 2.6 3.8 5.8 9.9 15.9 20.8 19.6 0.7 Long-run DOR
144 99 56 41 37 30 22 14 10 8 6 2 PV dollar-years debt
10 8 6 4 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 PV social costs
469 326 226 170 129 92 62 40 25 16 7 2 Accum. PV dollar-years debt
34 25 16 10 6 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 Accum. PV social costs
0.07 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 Req. ave. debtor surplus (b)
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Table 6: Subsidy, DLR, DOR, and pseudo-benefit-cost analysis for Grameen
Figures in millions of dollars as of Dec. 31, 1994.Andes Pro-Credito Pro-Credito Pro-Credito Organization
31-Dec-95 31-Dec-94 31-Dec-93 31-Dec-92 For the year ending
4,904 3,926 1,634 671 Rev. lending
251 113 54 51 Rev. other op.
5,155 4,040 1,688 722     Rev. op.
0 0 0 0 Grants as rev.
5,155 4,040 1,688 722     Total rev.
2,839 1,165 315 0 True exp. sub. debt
(1,685) (1,087) (298) (1) (Discount sub. debt)
1,153 78 17 1     Exp. sub. debt
5,219 4,825 3,231 1,769 True exp. other op.
(1,416) (1,476) (1,907) (1,387) (Discount other op.)
3,804 3,349 1,324 382     Exp. other op.
4,957 3,427 1,340 383     Total exp.
198 613 348 339     Acct. profit
0 0 0 0 (Dividends)
198 613 348 339     Change R.E.
5,155 4,040 1,688 722 Memo: Rev. op.
(2,839) (1,165) (315) 0 Memo: (True exp. sub. debt)
(5,219) (4,825) (3,231) (1,769) Memo: (True exp. other op.)
(2,903) (1,950) (1,858) (1,047)     Memo: True profit
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Table7: Stylized income statement for Andes
Source: Financial statements of Pro-Crédito and Caja los Andes. Figures in thousands of nominal
bolivianos.Andes Pro-Credito Pro-Credito Pro-Credito Organization
31-Dec-95 31-Dec-94 31-Dec-93 31-Dec-92 For the year ending
Assets
29,707 13,804 6,368 2,828 Net loan portfolio
3,280 2,711 2,169 735 Other assets
32,987 16,515 8,537 3,564     Total assets
Liabilities
19,909 8,981 3,077 0 Sub. debt
0 0 0 0 Dep. by poor
2,612 1,210 330 18 Other libs.
22,522 10,191 3,407 18     Total libs.
Equity
0 0 0 0 Open. paid-in cap.
0 0 0 0 Change paid-in cap.
0 0 0 0     Close. paid-in cap.
5,023 4,442 3,207 0 Open. cap. grants
3,944 581 1,235 3,207 Grants as equity
8,967 5,023 4,442 3,207     Close. cap. grants
1,299 686 339 0 Open. R.E.
198 613 348 339 Change R.E.
1,497 1,299 686 339     Close R.E.
10,464 6,322 5,129 3,546         Total equity
32,986 16,513 8,536 3,564         Total libs. and equity
0 0 0 0 Memo: Ave. dep. by poor
14,445 6,029 1,538 0 Memo: Ave. sub. debt
21,755 10,086 4,598 1,414 Memo: Ave. net loan port.
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Table 8: Stylized balance sheet for Andes
Source: Financial statements of Pro-Crédito and Caja los Andes. Figures in thousands of nominal
bolivianos.Andes Pro-Credito Pro-Credito Pro-Credito Organization
31-Dec-95 31-Dec-94 31-Dec-93 31-Dec-92 For the year ending
0 0 0 0 Grants as rev.
3,944 581 1,235 3,207 Grants as equity
1,685 1,087 298 1 Disc. sub. debt
1,416 1,476 1,907 1,387 Disc. other op.
7,044 3,144 3,441 4,595     4 forms new sub. rsrc.
11,180 8,036 4,595 0     Open. accum. new sub.
(2,903) (1,950) (1,858) (1,047) True profit
(4,856) (2,905) (1,047) 0     Open. accum. true profit
1,650 1,107 888 369 Trad. subsidy
4,553 3,057 2,746 1,417 Trad. comp. subsidy
93% 78% 168% 211% Trad SDI
23% 39% 36% 47% On-lending I.R.
43% 69% 95% 148% Subsidy-free on-lending I.R.
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Table 9: Trad. SDI for Andes
Figures in thousands of nominal bolivianos.Andes Pro-Credito Pro-Credito Pro-Credito Organization
31-Dec-95 31-Dec-94 31-Dec-93 31-Dec-92 For the year ending
0 0 0 0 Grants as rev.
3,944 581 1,235 3,207 Grants as equity
1,685 1,087 298 1 Disc. sub. debt
1,416 1,476 1,907 1,387 Disc. other op.
7,044 3,144 3,441 4,595     4 new sub. rsrc.
11,180 8,036 4,595 0     Open. accum. new sub.
(2,903) (1,950) (1,858) (1,047) True profit
(4,856) (2,905) (1,047) 0     Open. accum. true profit
0 0 0 0 Dividends
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 Alpha
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 Rho short-run
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 Rho long-run
4,030 1,974 534 0 Open. accum. short-run sub.
3,204 2,056 1,440 534 Mod. short-run sub.
6,107 4,006 3,298 1,581 Mod. short-run comp. sub.
125% 102% 202% 236% Mod. short-run SDI
23% 39% 36% 47% On-lending I.R.
51% 79% 107% 159% Subsidy-free on-lending I.R.
4,600 2,096 534 0 Open accum. long-run sub.
4,206 2,504 1,562 534 Mod. long-run sub.
7,109 4,454 3,420 1,581 Mod. long-run comp. sub.
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Table 10: Mod. SDI for Andes
Figures in thousands of nominal bolivianos.Andes Pro-Credito Pro-Credito Pro-Credito Organization
31-Dec-95 31-Dec-94 31-Dec-93 31-Dec-92 For the year ending
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 Rho short-run
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 Rho long-run
1,918 907 242 0 Open. accum. short-run sub.
1,548 1,011 665 242 Mod. short-run sub.
4,451 2,962 2,523 1,289 Mod. short-run comp. sub.
2,042 932 242 0 Open accum. long-run sub.
1,762 1,109 690 242 Mod. long-run sub.
4,665 3,060 2,548 1,289 Mod. long-run comp. sub.
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Table 11: Mod. subsidy for Andes from society
Figures in thousands of nominal bolivianos.Andes Pro-Credito Pro-Credito Pro-Credito Organization
31-Dec-95 31-Dec-94 31-Dec-93 31-Dec-92 For the year ending
4,699 2,400 1,182 395 $-years debt in period
8,676 3,977 1,576 395 Accum. $-years debt
Point of view of DFI
356 263 228 103 Trad. subsidy
692 489 370 149 Mod. short-run sub.
909 596 401 149 Mod. long-run sub.
951 595 331 103 Accum. trad. sub.
1,700 1,008 519 149 Acc. mod. short-run sub.
2,055 1,146 550 149 Acc. mod. long-run sub.
Point of view of society
334 241 171 67 Mod. short-run sub.
381 264 177 67 Mod. long-run sub.
890 509 245 67 Acc. mod. long-run sub.
0.08 0.05 0.02 0.00 Short-run DLR
0.06 0.04 0.02 0.00 Long-run DLR
2.8 3.5 2.4 2.8 Short-run DOR
2.9 3.0 2.5 2.8 Long-run DOR
3,828 2,058 1,066 375 PV dollar-years debt
310 226 160 64 PV social costs
7,327 3,499 1,441 375 Accum. PV dollar-years debt
761 451 224 64 Accum. PV social costs
0.10 0.13 0.16 0.17 Req. ave. debtor surplus (b)
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Table 12: Subsidy, DLR and pseudo-benefit-cost for Andes
Figures in thousands of dollars as of Dec. 31, 1995.40
Appendix 1: The Parable of the Subsidized Servant
Measuring the subsidy received by a subsidized development finance institution is like a rich
man who left home to go to a far country. He called his three servants to entrust them with some of
his property. The rich man left most of his wealth with bankers who paid 10 percent, compounded
twice a year, but he also left 10,000 shekels with each of the three servants. Then the rich man left
on his trip.
The first servant went at once and left his money with the bankers. After a year, he got
interest of 10,000@[1+(0.10/2)] –10,000=1,025 shekels.
2
The second servant went and built a granary out of bricks. After a year it was done and it was
worth 10,000 shekels.
The third servant went off, dug a hole in the ground, and hid his master’s money.
After a year the rich man came back. He planned to take a trip again soon, so he called in the
three servants to reckon the accounts. The first servant handed over the interest he had earned. “You
gave me 10,000 shekels, sir,” he said. “Look! Here is another 1,025.” “Well done, good and faithful
servant!” said his master. “You have been faithful in managing this amount, so I will leave you in
charge of it.”
Then the second servant came in and said, “Master, you gave me 10,000 shekels, and I built
this granary, also worth 10,000 shekels. With your permission, I will rent it out next year.” The rich
man was doubtful, but he liked the servant and wanted to trust him. “You have worked hard in
managing this amount, so I will leave you in charge of it. But when I come back, I want to get at least
10,000@[1+(0.10/2)] –10,000=2,155 shekels.”
4
Then the third servant came in and said, “Sir, I know you are a hard man; you reap where you
did not sow, and you get a return where there was no trade. I was afraid, so I went off and hid your
money in the ground. Look! Here are your 10,000 shekels.” “You wicked and slothful servant!” his
master said. “You knew, did you, that I reap where I did not sow and earn a return where there was
no trade? Well, then, you should have put my money in the bank, and I would have got it all back
now, with interest.”
The rich man began to give the order that the third servant be sold as a slave, along with his
wife, cattle, and other property, in order pay for the debt of the interest that the rich man could have
collected. The third servant fell on his knees and began to wail and gnash his teeth. “Be patient with
me,” he begged, “and I will pay you everything.” The rich man took pity on him and said, “You may
go, but I want to get at least 10,000@[1+(0.10/2)] –10,000=2,155 shekels when I come back.”
4
Again the rich man left. The first servant went again and left his money with the bankers. In
a year, he got 1,025 shekels. The second servant rented out his granary for the year for 2,000 shekels.
The third servant crept behind the first servant, watching. He saw him leave his money with the
bankers, so he did the same.
After a year, the rich man came back. He again called in the three servants to reckon the
accounts. The first servant handed over what he had earned. “You gave me 10,000 shekels, sir,” he41
said. “Look! Here are another 1,025.” “Well done, good and faithful servant!” said his master. “Come
on in and celebrate my return with me!”
Then the second servant came in said, “Master, I earned 2,000 shekels renting the granary I
built with your money. Here it is!” The rich man grew angry and began to throttle the servant.
“Fool!”, he said, “did you not know that I reap where I did not sow and earn a return where there
was no trade? Well, then, you should have set the rent high enough to pay not only for the use of the
10,000 over the two years, but also for the use of the interest I could have received during the two
years but instead allowed you to keep!” The second servant fell on his knees and began to beg.
“Please sir, be patient with me,” he said. “Now that my customers know the granary is safe, I can earn
more than enough next year to cover the losses so far.” But the rich man hardened his heart, and he
had the second servant jailed until he could pay the debt of 155 shekels.
Then the third servant came in and said, “Voilà! You gave me 10,000 shekels, and here are
another 1,025 that I have earned.” “You wicked and slothful servant!” his master began. “Did you
not know that I reap where I did not sow and earn a return where there was no trade?” The rich man
signaled for the jailer.
“Wait!” said the third servant. “If we ignore the fact that I did not pay you anything last year,
then this year I got exactly what you could have got with the bankers.” The rich man stopped. The
third servant said: “That is how the subsidy of DFIs is traditionally done.” The rich man gave in.
“Well done, good and faithful servant!” he said.“Come on in and celebrate my return with me!”42
Appendix 2: Calculations for the Grameen Bank
The appendix has technical notes on the calculations for the Grameen Bank. The financial
statements are from Hashemi (1997) for 1983 to 1986 and from Khandker et al. (1995) for 1987 to
1994. In general, both subsidy and benefits have been underestimated while trying to replicate the
assumptions and choices of  Khandker et al. (1995) as closely as possible. When Khandker et al.
(1995) veer from the logic of the traditional framework, it is always on the side of underestimating
subsidy. Thus following Khandker et al. (1995) makes the results here both conservative and
replicable.
For example, this paper follows Khandker et al. (1995) in ignoring the implicit subsidy
enjoyed by Grameen from exemption from reserve requirements for deposits (Yaron, 1992a). This
paper also follows Khandker et al. (1995) in taking the 3-year deposit rate at the end of each period
as reported by the International Monetary Fund as the opportunity cost to Grameen for both
subsidized debt and subsidized equity. Not only is would the correct rate be an average rate over a
period, but also Grameen would not pay the 3-year deposit rate if it replaced its subsidized funds with
market funds (Morduch, 1997). In addition, this rate does not have a premium for risk, nor does it
distinguish between the opportunity costs of debt and of equity (Benjamin, 1994). Thus, the modified
SDI here is still lower than it needs to be even though it is a higher lower bound on the subsidy
received by Grameen than the traditional SDI in Khandker et al. (1995).
This paper also uses the annual averages of stocks in Khandker et al. (1995) when those
average are not the simple average of the stocks at the opening and the closing of the period. The
discount on subsidized debt follows Khandker et al. (1995).
Like Hashemi (1997) and Khandker et al. (1995), this paper pretends that Grameen did not
exist before 1983. Excluding these years produces some erratic ratios in the first few years included
in the analysis. Including the first years would increase the estimated subsidy because these years
include fixed start-up costs and because economies of scale were still relatively unexploited. The
increase in the estimated subsidy would be small, however, because Grameen was small and so its
costs were small compared Grameen’s later size and costs.
Some of the erratic ratios in the first few years are also explained by the fact that Hashemi
(1997) is less detailed for 1983 to 1986 than is Khandker et al. (1995) for 1987 to 1994. Some
assumptions had to be made for 1983 to 1986 that did not have to be made for 1987 to 1994. In
particular, it was assumed that before 1987 there were no grants accounted for as revenue nor
discounts on other operations. All debt from 1983-1986 was assumed to be subsidized, which is very
close to the truth (Hossain, 1988).
This paper diverges from Khandker et al. (1995) in that all grants are counted as equity.
Grants will not be repaid like loans. Grants are not even a residual claim on Grameen. Since the
opportunity costs of debt and equity are assumed equal, this does not affect the results.
This paper also assumes that grants accounted for as equity caused any increase in equity not
due to retained earnings nor to increases in paid-in capital. This causes some very small negative
grants accounted for as equity in 1985 and 1986.
    43
Khandker et al. (1995) ignore the fact that most of Grameen’s shares are privately owned.
In 1995, members owned about 85 percent of Grameen’s shares, and the government of Bangladesh
owned the rest (Hashemi, 1997). The modified estimates in this paper underestimate subsidy by
assuming that all shares are privately owned. The SDI  given here ignores private owners for
T
comparability with Khandker et al. (1995).
This paper underestimates benefits by ignoring benefits accruing to Grameen’s depositors and
owners. In addition, the paper ignores any secondary benefits not accruing to customers of Grameen.
It also ignores any benefits of the discipline infused by Grameen. Studies measuring the benefits of
Grameen include Pitt and Khandker (1996), Goetz and Gupta (1996), and Hashemi et al. (1996).
Flows of nominal taka are converted to dollars as of Dec. 31, 1994 as suggested by Christen
(1997). First, the nominal taka flows in a period are inflated to units as of the end of the period using
the average inflation rate in the period as computed with monthly data from the International
Monetary Fund. Then this figure is inflated to units of taka as of Dec. 31, 1994 according to the
inflation between the end of the period and the end of 1994. Finally, the taka are converted to dollars
with the exchange rate as of the end of 1994. The conversion factor in Table 13 incorporates these
three steps. It was assumed that the annual rate of change in the conversion factor from 1983 to 1986
was the same as the annual rate of change between 1987 and 1989.Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Organization
31-Dec-94 31-Dec-93 31-Dec-92 31-Dec-91 31-Dec-90 31-Dec-89 31-Dec-88 31-Dec-87 31-Dec-86 31-Dec-85 31-Dec-84 31-Dec-83 For the year ending
0.060 0.130 0.130 0.138 0.140 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 Opp. cost sub. debt DFI
0.060 0.130 0.130 0.138 0.140 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 Opp. cost equity DFI
0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 Opp. cost sub. debt society
0.1 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 Opp. cost equity society
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Any private owners?
0.0266 0.0266 0.0266 0.0278 0.0298 0.0322 0.0352 0.0381 0.0417 0.0449 0.0485 0.0524 Conv. flow Taka to 12/31/94 $
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 Weight rich taxpayers
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 Weight poor debtors
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 Social discount rate
12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Periods from time 0
0.540 0.569 0.599 0.630 0.663 0.698 0.735 0.774 0.815 0.857 0.903 0.950 Discount factor
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Table 13: Parameters and assumptions for Grameen45
Appendix 3: Calculations for Caja los Andes
The appendix has technical notes on the calculations for Andes. The data was collected in
Bolivia in 1995. In constant to Grameen, the only known subsidies that are omitted for Andes are
some expenses for training paid by donors in 1992.
The opportunity costs of debt and of equity were based on the monthly average of the prime
rate in Bolivia. A risk premium was added using the framework of Benjamin (1994). Still, the
opportunity cost of debt and equity are lower than what Andes would probably pay in the market to
replace its subsidized resources.
Annual averages of stocks are the simple average of the stocks at the opening and the closing
of the period. Since Andes has grown quickly, this understates the true average, but it makes
replication of the calculations easier.
Andes got a lot of subsidized resources as foreign consultants paid by donors. These expenses
were valued at their cost to donors. Andes also got some grants accounted for as equity. About
$100,000 accounted for as a loan without interest or due date was shifted to grants accounted for as
equity. Andes has had some debt from market sources. Although Andes could take deposits in 1995,
it did not take any until 1996.
All of Andes’ equity is subsidized. When Pro-Crédito morphed into Andes in 1995, there was
a façade that 10 percent of the shares were bought by private people. But donors gave these people
the money they used to buy the shares. Pro-Crédito, itself nebulously owned, owns 60 percent of
Andes. Donors own the other 30 percent. 
Flows of nominal bolivianos are converted to dollars as of Dec. 31, 1995 as with Grameen.Andes Pro-Credito Pro-Credito Pro-Credito Organization
31-Dec-95 31-Dec-94 31-Dec-93 31-Dec-92 For the year ending
0.255 0.232 0.229 0.228 Opp. cost sub. debt DFI
0.197 0.193 0.205 0.208 Opp. cost equity DFI
0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 Opp. cost sub. debt society
0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 Opp. cost equity society
No No No No Any private owners?
0.2160 0.2380 0.2570 0.2790 Conv. flow Bs to 12/31/94 $
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 Weight rich taxpayers
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 Weight poor debtors
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 Social discount rate
4 3 2 1 Periods from time 0
0.815 0.857 0.903 0.950 Discount factor
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Table 14: Parameters and assumptions for Andes47
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